

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner  
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Overseas Writers Club  
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INTELLIGENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

I would like to talk about the important degree of change that is taking place in the United States Intelligence Community today. Change that is reaching into every element of intelligence activities. Change which I believe is beneficial. Change, however, which comes not just from conviction within but from the influence of three important external factors. The first of these is the changing perception of the country itself as to our role in international affairs. The second is the burgeoning increase in technical intelligence collection capabilities today. The third, closely related to you and your profession, is the much greater interest and concern of the American public in intelligence activities today than just a few years ago. Let me touch on each of these factors for change and then take your questions.

First, the changing perception of America's role in the world. I believe we are in a state of transition, a transition from a very activist, interventionist outlook toward international affairs to one in which we are recognizing more readily the limitations, the realities upon our ability to influence events in other countries. This is not to say that we are retrenching towards any degree of isolationism. In fact, I believe as a nation we are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to any semblance of intervention on the international scene and entering an era when our outlook toward the world and our role in it is

more realistic and more reasonable. The circumstances today however are such that we must gauge more carefully than ever before what our role in the world can be and should be.

Take for instance the difficulty we have today in just deciding whom we are for and whom we are against. Traditionally we have always been in favor of those whom the Soviets were against. Some of our choices today are not that simple. If you look just at 1978, there were a number of instances in which there were two Communist countries fighting each other. In some of those instances it was very clear that it was not wise for us to be in favor of either one or the other, even though the Soviets were supporting one of those parties.

Today it is not so clear that it is necessary for the United States to take sides in every international altercation, even if the Soviets are attempting to gain advantage from it. The consequences of a nation's succumbing to Communist influence are not as irreverisble as we perhaps once thought. Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia all were under considerable Communist influence at one time or another and have come back to be independent. So today there is in our body politic a legitimate question as to whether it is always necessary to come to the rescue of countries being subjected to Communist pressure.

And even when we do decide that some struggling nation deserves our support, there are problems today in giving it that did not exist just a few years ago. One of these, again closely related to you and your work, is the revolution in international communications. Any action that we take on the international scene today is almost instantly transmitted

around the globe; instantly analyzed; and instantly judged. Today that international public judgment, be it approbation or criticism, does influence events, and does inhibit the actions of major powers like the United States and the Soviet Union, even though those countries who pass judgment are very generally second or third level powers.

There are other difficulties today that we didn't face 10 or 20 years ago if we attempt to influence other countries through diplomacy or through international organizations. In the past most free nations took their cue on the international scene from us. Today in such fora as the United Nations, each country usually uses its one vote independently of what the major powers may desire and, in fact, frequently the major powers find themselves on the minority side of those votes.

If then out of frustration with diplomacy we should decide in the future to intervene militarily, we have to recall our lessons of Vietnam and recognize that when the pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry tends, as it does today, toward the defense, even a minor military power can give a major power a very difficult time.

What all this adds up to is not that we are impotent on the world scene but that the leverage of our influence, while still considerable, must be exercised much more subtly than ever before. We must be concerned with long-term influences rather than just putting fingers in the dike. We must be able to anticipate rather than just react to events. We must be able to interpret the underlying courses which can be influenced and driven over time. Now for us in the intelligence world this means that we must vastly expand the scope of our endeavor.

Thirty years ago our primary concern was to keep tabs on Soviet military development. Today the threat to our national well-being comes not just from actions of the Soviet Union, nor is it restricted to purely military concerns. Thus the subject matter with which we in intelligence must be intimately familiar, while it certainly continues to have a high military content, has broadened to include politics, economics, energy, population, terrorism, the health and psychiatry of international leaders, narcotics and so on. There is hardly an academic discipline, there is hardly an area of the world about which we do not need to be intimately informed to keep our foreign policymakers well advised. Hence, this is a demanding time for our intelligence organizations, a time of fundamental change in the subject matter with which we deal.

Looking quickly to a second element of change, the technological revolution which affects how we collect intelligence, let me start by pointing out there are three ways of gaining information about other countries, in a very general sense at least. By photographs from satellites and airplanes, by intercepting signals such as those that could be passing through this room right now, either from military activities or communications systems, and by the traditional human agent, the spy.

In our business the first two, photographic and signals intelligence, are what we call technical intelligence as opposed to the human means. Our capabilities in the technical area, thanks to the great sophistication of our industries, are burgeoning. Interestingly though, rather than denigrating the value of the traditional spy, technical capabilities have increased his importance. Broadly speaking, technical intelligence tells you something that happened sometime in the past. But that often

raises more questions than it answers. Why did it happen? What is going to happen next? Uncovering the concerns of other nations, the pressures which influence their decisions and their intentions is exactly the forte of the human intelligence activity. And it is indispensable that we have that capability if we are going to anticipate the future trends as I have been suggesting.

The real challenge in intelligence collection then is to be able to put all of our efforts together, the photographic, the signals, and the human, orchestrating them so that they complement each other and so that we can learn what we need to learn in the least expensive and the least risky manner. What questions a photograph cannot answer you try to solve with signals or human activity. For instance, the plans which may be hinted at in a conversation you try to confirm with a photograph, or if you have a photograph of some new factory in a foreign country and you wonder whether it is making nuclear weapons, you specifically target a human agent to try to find that information.

All this may sound very logical, very simple to you. But because our technical capabilities are growing rapidly and because intelligence in our country is a large bureaucracy spread over a number of different departments and agencies each with its own priorities and concerns, we can no longer do business in the traditional manner. It has taken some fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes.

The Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized to coordinate the national intelligence activities of our country ever since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. However, until recently

he had inadequate authority to do so. Just over a year ago, President Carter signed a new Executive Order which strengthened the authority of the Director over budgets and over the collection activities of all national intelligence organizations. The change is still evolving today. It is going well but is making a substantial difference in the management of intelligence.

Finally, let me hit the third topic which is driving change. That is the increased public attention since the investigations of 1974 to 1976. These investigations brought to American intelligence more public attention than ever in the history of mankind has been brought to bear on a major intelligence activity. The impact of all this added visibility has been substantial, and in some respects it has been traumatic. The right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to us and to the public. By the right kind of visibility, I mean the public's access to information which permits you to understand at least generically what we are doing and why we are doing it, and which confirms that the proper controls established over the intelligence apparatus are in fact effective. To achieve this we are trying today to be more open about the things we do. We are passing more of what we do directly to you in the form of unclassified analyses which we distribute to the public. We are answering questions more. We are speaking more in public as I am with you this morning and we are participating more in symposia and academic conferences. I know that the Intelligence Community of our country is doing an honorable and a vital job for our country and for the free world. It is doing it well and I personally want you to know as much about it as possible. And parenthetically I would mention, because you are an Overseas Writers

organization, that I believe this trend towards greater openness, greater visibility in intelligence is not unique in our country but it is a process that is taking hold in other free democratic societies.

Let me add though that some of the visibility that we receive is definitely unwanted. Unwanted because it benefits neither Americans, nor friends, nor allies. Here, of course, I am talking primarily about unauthorized disclosures of properly classified information. Our need for some level of secrecy appears to run contradictory to your imperative to keep the American public informed. But let me suggest that we do meet on some common ground despite this contradiction. To begin with I am emphasizing our need for secrecy primarily because of our need to protect our sources. I hardly need to elaborate on that topic in front of a profession who has had members go to jail to protect their sources. Let me add though that we also need to protect some information that does not reveal sources. This is primarily information which, if it is held uniquely by our decisionmakers, will be of special value to our country. Again, however, this is not something unknown to you because it is nothing more than an exclusive. You have spent a lot of your efforts and time in protecting your own exclusives. So we do have common ground. We can understand each others motives and purposes.

On our side we are trying more to understand your imperative of informing the public by our effort to be more open and more responsive. Let me suggest on your side that I would not think of asking you to be less perservering or to cover up or to ignore our faults. But I would question whether sometimes members of the media today are not overly eager to resurrect old, well-worn stories about the Central Intelligence

Agency and then play them as though they just happened yesterday, until you get to the penultimate paragraph when it says 1953. I would also question whether some of the media always apply the same standards of truth and confirmation to leaks of intelligence information as they do to other stories. Let me suggest to you that in my experience, a large percentage of those who offer these leaks are people who have selfish, not altruistic motives, people who are out to use the American media and through them the American public.

Finally, let me also suggest that there are times when the media should recognize that it might not be in the interest of the free world to publish something, especially security information which you may receive. For instance, the names of our agents. I do not accept the excuse which is often made that you must publish it because if you do not, Joe or Bill or Mary will; or, because if you have come into possession of it the KGB certainly must also have it. Yet while I make these somewhat critical comments let me end by acknowledging how difficult the choices are that you have to make in these areas. I recognize that fully. They are difficult judgment calls, each one unique to itself. I only suggest some balance here is very necessary to our welfare.

Let me though add that the net impact of all this visibility I have been mentioning is, in my view, a net plus for the United States and for its Intelligence Community. We must have public support. We must avoid the abuses of the past. And yet there are definite minuses to this visibility too. There are inhibitions on the actions that we could take, on the risks that we will take. The issue before our country today is really: how much assurance does this nation need against invasions of



privacy and against the possible taking of foreign policy steps that would be considered unethical; and how do we balance these desires for privacy and propriety with a resulting reduction in our intelligence capabilities and covert action potential.

Congress is expected to give expression to this question of balance in the enactment of legislation called Charters for the Intelligence Community. Such legislation would set out our authorities as well as the parameters within which we are permitted to work. It is my sincere hope that such legislation will be passed by this Congress--written with care, with sensitivity to problems like those I have been discussing with you, it can help to resolve some of these difficulties. Overreaction either by tying the Intelligence Community's hands or by not imposing any restrictions whatsoever would be a mistake--on the one hand inviting a repetition of abuses, on the other hand emasculating necessary intelligence capabilities.

After all these comments, plus and minus, let me end with an assurance that in my view the intelligence arm of the United States Government today is strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change. That is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. Out of this present metamorphosis is emerging an Intelligence Community in which the legal rights of our citizens and the constraints and the controls on intelligence activities are going to be balanced with a need to garner necessary information for the conduct of foreign policy. This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet but we are moving rapidly and surely in the right direction. When we reach our goal we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American model of

intelligence reflecting the laws and the ideals of our country, and one which I believe will be a precursor to similar changes in countries all over the free world. Thank you very much, let me have your questions.

Q's & A's -- Admiral Turner -- Overseas Writers Club -- 12 April 1979

Richard Valariani:

Admiral Turner, I'm going to ask you a question about what you call the traditional human agent, the spy. While we were having lunch the Prime Minister of South Africa claimed that the United States has engaged in a massive spying operation against his country. Several American diplomats had been asked to leave the country. Can you tell us -- has the United States been engaged in massive spying in South Africa and to what end?

Admiral Turner:

No. Next question. No, I can't tell you. It's a basic policy that we do not comment on intelligence operations, whether we were doing them or whether we were not doing them. Because you know the technique of pushing us into the corner on that one very easily.

<sup>UDWIN</sup>  
Jerry ~~Udman~~, Westinghouse Broadcasting:

How much less are American spies feared than they used to be because of whatever moral or governmental restraints are upon them and in what ways does that hurt the United States' interests?

Admiral Turner:

I certainly ~~don't~~ see no degree of let-up of counterintelligence activities on the part of the KGB, who are very, very active in that field. Let me suggest that the majority of these restraints upon us have to do with protecting the rights of ~~the~~ privacy of our citizenry. Now that sometimes, of course is, or largely as far as our role is concerned, ~~is~~ overseas. ~~and~~ Where it has inhibited us <sup>to</sup> the country's detriment most are in things like narcotics, where if we get some information and then an American intrudes on the scene, then we're precluded from continuing to pursue that type of information and the country in a sense ~~loses~~ losses. But that's a trade-off we have to make as a nation, as I sort of suggested.

Jim ~~Anderson~~: <sup>UPI</sup>

Admiral, I'd like to ask you a SALT-related question. We are told repeatedly that the Administration will not send forward a SALT treaty that cannot be verified. But yesterday, for example, we had some quite convincing statements to people who, like yourself, are retired military officers, ~~are~~ saying that the SALT treaty as they see it now, is not verifiable. Can you tell us anything now that would convince us that with the loss of the Iranian posts, the SALT treaty would give you the necessary confidence that any cheating by the Soviets would be picked up?

Admiral Turner:

Let me try to make my role in SALT verification expressly clear. We divide this into two terms: ~~the~~ monitoring and verifying. Monitoring is the act of telling what the Soviets are doing with relation to each of the provisions of the treaty that limit strategic force activities. For each monitoring activity, I will be able to go to the Senate and say ~~that~~ I have this level of confidence that any change in these parameters will be detected. Whether that is adequate to verify the treaty is a decision for policymakers. Because you have to weigh with that does that change that Turner has monitored really violate the treaty? Every provision is not as express as to say 1320 missiles of this type. Beyond that, the policymaker must also say, "in view of the fact ~~that~~ Turner hasn't got 101% assurance on any of these things, are the risks to our country worth it?" ~~the~~ <sup>symbol</sup> the benefits of having these <sup>symbols</sup> worth whatever degree of possibility there is from the monitoring evaluation that it could be circumscribed, or circumvented, or whatever the right word is -- cheat. If I get into saying my opinion of these factors of interpretation of the treaty and cost benefits to the country of the risks and benefits of having this treaty as opposed to having none, then the objectivity of my position on how well we can monitor will be questioned. People will say, "No, He's saying the monitoring is 95% sure because he's taken the position the treaty is verifiable." I don't want that to happen because I should be the impartial SOB who is able to stand up and say, "with these instruments of intelligence collection and these techniques of analysis, Senator I can do this for you on checking on provision 17B of the treaty." So I won't answer your question, nor will I answer it for the Senate of the United States. But I will give the Senate and of course I am giving the Executive Branch regularly, every detail of what our capability will be to monitor, to observe, to check on each provision of the treaty. And there are so many of those, that even if you asked this broad question, "Is the treaty verifiable?" you really are asking a very meaningless question. ~~But~~ <sup>what</sup> you have to finally get to with those who are qualified to pass judgment on verifiability, is what provisions of the treaty are so weakly verifiable in their view that it should not be passed.

*Jim Anderson, UPI:*

Can I just try again, since you couldn't answer that question. On a more specific basis, can you say, did the loss of the Iranian posts lower your level of confidence in our ability to verify?

Admiral Turner:

Yes.

*Jim Anderson, UPI:*

Can you say how much?

Admiral Turner:

No. Because even if I were willing and able to share that with

you, which I can't, because it's highly classified, you just can't answer that in any kind of a very simple way. You've got to take a provision of the treaty and you've got to say, versus this, what does it do? Then you've got to ~~go and~~ explain ~~to you~~ what the alternatives are to using those methods of collection. And that just gets above our heads in this unclassified forum.

Nick Daniloff: **UPI**

Admiral Turner, I have a two-part question for you. The WASHINGTON STAR today in a front-page story reports that the Intelligence Community has discovered 1,000 new strategic Soviet missiles which we weren't aware of. In other words, the Soviets have about 3500 strategic missiles instead of 2500. Now I'd like you to comment on the veracity of that report. The second question is this. Some of your critics have charged that you've placed too much emphasis in ~~technical~~ <sup>electronic</sup> intelligence -- satellites, signals and so forth, to the detriment of the human spy. You did comment on that in your opening remarks. I would like you to give us some appreciation of what role you feel the human spy has today in intelligence collection.

Admiral Turner:

Well, I tried to mention that in my remarks. The human intelligence input is a fundamental part of the three-pronged process. And it primarily lets you understand what people are thinking, doing, planning, what their intentions are. It is the most risky, not the most costly, of the techniques of collecting intelligence. Therefore, it is my view <sup>that while</sup> you don't downplay it, ~~you don't~~ ever use it when you can do it -- that's an overstatement -- but you try not to use the human when you can do it by technical means. But the quality of what you get from each of these techniques is different. A photograph tells you certain things. Clearly, you wouldn't want to run your reporting just on photographs. You've got to talk to people. Clearly, we're in exactly the same business. And we can't get along without talking with people. You can listen to people talk, but you like to be able to ask the questions. You wouldn't be happy just to sit and listen to the ~~telephone~~ <sup>companies'</sup> circuits in this city to try to do your reporting. Seriously, you would not be content with just that. You would like to have that line run by

~~But that would not, if~~ you could not interrogate people and get your particular questions answered, you wouldn't be very happy. And we're in exactly the same business. We're trying to piece together the elusive details of information which, one by one, put a picture puzzle into place. And we need all three of these. And there has not been in recent years, and certainly not in my two years here, any degradation of that capability, or any less emphasis on it. But I was asked that question on Capitol Hill a few days ago at the end of a hearing. My response was, "Sirs, I have now been here for two hours and 15 minutes, two hours and 10 minutes of which you interrogated me about our

technical systems." And that is what gives a misperception that we're more interested in the technical. Why, because the technical costs a lot of money. Because the technical, when you make a decision today, you've got to live with it for 10 years, probably. And it happens we're in a phase in intelligence when the technical decisions have got to be made. You know, you go in lulls and peaks. And ~~you know~~ we're in a peak right now. ~~You know~~, you buy all your airplanes one year and all your submarines the next, and that kind of thing, and it's the same way with us. So it does get a lot more attention. But it's not because we're neglecting the other. It doesn't require as much discussion and debate.

*Nick Daniloff, UPT:*

How about the first part of the question, Admiral, ~~about the...~~

Admiral Turner:

No comment. You don't comment on intelligence operations or facts.

Don Oberdoffer: **POST**

Admiral Turner, was the decline and ultimate fall of the Shah of Iran last fall an intelligence failure and, specifically, what about the charge that was reported in the article that was reprinted in Sunday's POST that you kept postponing the issuance of a new intelligence estimate on Iran because the White House didn't want to hear the news that that estimate would have conveyed?

Admiral Turner:

Let me take the last part first because it's the easiest. That's absolutely untrue. I did reject an intelligence estimate on Iran and had ~~it~~ reworked because it was not a balanced piece of work and because it was far too optimistic as to the possibility of the Shah remaining in power. Now I'm not upset that somebody brought me that kind of an estimate. I want different, divergent views to come forward on these estimates. They've got to because none of us has perfect insight. But when this came forward, there were several views in it. I thought it was overbalanced towards the side of optimism as to the Shah's endurance. I sent it back to be reworked in August. By the time it was reworked and came back to me again, it was clear the situation in Iran was so fluid ~~that~~ to publish an estimate, which is a long-term look at things, was not a profitable thing to do, so we never did publish it despite the fact that it's been played back and quoted as having been a National Intelligence Estimate which it was not.

The first part of your question, I don't think it was an intelligence failure in Iran. But I will say, I'd like to do better. I'd like to do better in any of these cases. The most difficult part about intelligence, the most difficult part about political newspaper reporting is to predict changes of government, coups,

assassinations, plots, major political upheavals. We all would like to be more prescient (~~spelling?~~). In this case, I think it was a very difficult one. Why? We all saw the discontent. We saw it in political areas. We saw it in economic areas. We saw it in religious areas, cultural areas. But we didn't see that a 78-year-old exiled cleric would be the force that would coalesce all of these areas of discontent to where they got out of control. Nor did any of us anticipate that when the chips were down the Shah, with a strong police power, would not be able to exercise that power to control this dissidence. We, me personally, overestimated the possibility, the probability, that the Shah would step in at the right moment and get the dissidents back under his control. I guess he missed that too. He missed the critical point. And I'm happy to have any of you who predicted it better than we did stand up and tell me so because I didn't read your columns.

Bern<sup>and</sup> Kalb:

Admiral, I have a two-part question if I can get in two. What's your estimate, do you think sir, where Idi Amin might take refuge.

Admiral Turner:

His family's in Iraq. ~~I don't know~~ <sup>W</sup> whether he'll go to join them or not, I don't know, but Mrs. Amin is in Iraq.

Bern<sup>and</sup> Kalb:

A question on China if I may. How do you explain the turning on of the screws once again after a rather brief experiment in what might be called a liberalized attitude on the part of Deng Xiaoping's (~~Chinese Premier's~~) leadership.

Admiral Turner:

Well, that was a major shift in their approach to the expression of dissent and I suppose with an experiment like that they're adjusting the sails, trimming them to find out what is the right amount of dissent that will suit their purposes. I wouldn't be surprised when anybody changes ~~that~~ <sup>back</sup> that much that he has to do some adjustment to suit his particular purposes.

Edward P. Morgan:

Admiral Turner. You indicated, or at least I inferred from your remarks, that despite the classic collision course, so to speak, between intelligence and the media, <sup>that</sup> the situation net was pretty much of a plus. What about Congress? Congress over the recent years has been showing an eloquent independence of the Executive Branch in terms of cooperation and so forth. What about the realism, the fairness, the insight of Congress in passing laws

and attempting, as its role indicates to a degree, to control the Intelligence Community?

Admiral Turner:

There are one or two areas where I would frankly like some help from the Congress. Some years ago they passed an act called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which requires that if we're to do a covert action, we must notify up to seven committees of the Congress. That's a lot of people to know that something is covert. And I don't make any aspersions on the ability of the Congress to keep things secret. There's a basic law that the possibility of a leak is geometrically proportional to the number of people who know it. And we'd like to get that visibility reduced, preferably to the Intelligence Committees who could then ensure that it was disseminated as absolutely necessary to other committees who had actions that might be affected by it. The law of the Congress in Freedom of Information is a good law. It's one that I support. But 116 man-years, some of which are dedicated to supplying ~~the~~ requests of the Polish Embassy, is not a good use of your and my money as taxpayers when, after those 116 man-years, we can produce very little that isn't properly qualified. We've not ever lost a challenge in the courts on our fairness in keeping only that which is necessary out of the public domain. It isn't worth it. We cannot afford to turn over to the public information which discloses our sources, our liaison with foreign countries, and so on. And that kind of material should be exempted so ~~that~~ we don't have to do a tremendous screening process. I don't know how you file in your home offices, but we in our business, because we must protect our sources, ~~we~~ file in separate compartments. And when you get a request where somebody just comes in and ~~says~~, I'm trying to think of one that came in just the other day. All the film footage that we may have about Vietnam going back to 1940. Now that's the actual extent of the request, that's how closely defined it is. Imagine the man-hours that we will have to take to get out a projector ~~and~~ go through all that or, if ~~it~~ were documents, to go through each of these different compartments. ~~Because~~ You have to look at it, even though you know the odds are extremely high that you can't release it. It's wasteful, and it gives a perception to our sources that they may get exposed. We've not exposed any through the Freedom of Information Act. I want to have the Freedom of Information Act applicable to us but on the kinds of activities that affect our people. I want people to be able to write in and say, "have you got something on me?" if they want to. But not this broad, shotgun approach that impinges on our sources. Finally, we have an Espionage Act in this country that requires ~~that~~ for prosecution, that <sup>you be able to prove</sup> the individual willingly, wantonly gave the information to a foreign power. Yet we have Mr. Agee running around writing books, publishing pamphlets in Washington, disclosing the names of our CIA officers around the globe, putting their lives at risk, ruining their usefulness to us, spoiling their professional careers, and we can't adequately handle that. <sup>AT</sup> You're in the Department of Agriculture and you



disclose something about grain futures, you can go to jail. If you disclose the name of a case officer in the United States Central Intelligence Agency and you don't do it to a foreign power but to one of you ladies and gentlemen, there's no way we can prosecute you.

~~Next question -- accent -- no name~~

Admiral, your former colleague, General Graham, said yesterday the sale of the satellite manual to the Russians jeopardizes the activity of the ~~KH-11~~ satellite. I just wonder whether you agree with that judgment and secondly, in that connection, if you regard the sale of the manual when you look at certain incidents, the Paisley case and other things, how much are you concerned about Soviet moles in your organization?

Admiral Turner:

To answer your first question, I don't agree with General Graham at all. To answer your second question, I do not have any evidence that there is a mole in the Central Intelligence Agency but I will never stand other than vigilant to look for one. You cannot be complacent in that department. There's nothing in the Paisley case that's come ~~to~~ <sup>under</sup> my attention that leads me to believe ~~that~~ he was associated with a mole or that there was anything but a suicide involved.

Ed Prina:

Admiral, SALT verification has, of course, always been a difficult problem even before the loss of the Iranian facilities and the KH-11 satellite. I'm wondering, can we make up for that loss of capability even within the lifetime of a SALT treaty? And I ask that in having the background of General Graham's statement yesterday in which he said, "don't let them tell you that the stations in Turkey will do, that's fraudulent. Don't let them tell you they can do it by aircraft, that's a fraud. Don't let them tell you they can build and deploy new satellites in time, that's also a fraud."

Admiral Turner:

Ed, the damage that has been done to our country already by the improper revelations on this SALT question is serious. It is <sup>a</sup> very difficult and will be <sup>a</sup> very difficult <sup>damage</sup> for you in the media in the months ahead as the SALT debate continues. We must absolutely keep the details of monitoring and verification out of the media. I must make every effort to do that. It will unravel like a ball of string if we don't. Because there's no single panacea to verifying, monitoring any particular provision of the treaty. It always comes as a conglomeration of several of the kinds of techniques we have been discussing. So if I answer your question it leads me then to discuss four more kinds of intelligence activities which haven't been discussed in the media lately, and we just lay out for everybody, particularly

of course for the Soviets, all of our intelligence techniques to verify SALT and if we do that, I'll guarantee you we won't be able to verify it over the long run. There is no intelligence collection technique that does not have a counter. And when you disclose its capabilities in detail, as we are doing progressively, you invite, eventually, the creation of the counter. And that not only spoils our collection capability, it costs you and me billions of dollars in our pockets.

Marty Schramm:

Let me go back and try to follow up on the answer you gave to Don Oberdorfer's question. You said that the Agency and you, in fact, had overestimated the possibility that the Shah could or would step in to put down the rebellion there with all the police authority available to him. And, what I was wondering was, first of all, why do you think the Shah did not step in at the time you expected him to. Was it because he psychologically wasn't up to doing that or was it for other reasons and, number two, did we, did you, ever urge him to step in at that time? And maybe number three, when was that time?

Admiral Turner:

Number one: It's my guess that the Shah, as we, if you don't mind as you, did not perceive himself (being on the scene, being an Iranian) how serious the situation had become and therefore he judged by the time he faced up to that decision that it was too late. I could be totally wrong. I don't know, but that's my appreciation of him. Why, because it really was a truly revolutionary situation. ~~You know~~ In retrospect, there was no group we could have gone and penetrated and spied on and found out what their plans were. There wasn't a ~~group~~ <sup>group</sup> that organized and imposed a revolution on Iran. It was a spontaneous upheaval throughout the country that did coalesce around the Islamic label. I'm not privileged to discuss with you the State Department's role in this with the advice to the Shah.

Marty Schramm:

Was there advice that would have gone through any other channel than the State Department?

Admiral Turner:

I don't know. The State Department can use all kinds of channels I'm in the covert action business which is giving advice if properly authorized. So, yes, there are other channels that could have been used but I'm not commenting on whether any of them were used in this case.

Admiral, do you believe that Saudi Arabia is susceptible to the same type of upheaval that occurred in Iran? If not, do you believe that the Saudi policy might be neutralized, that the anti-Communist aspect of Saudi policy might be neutralized by the fact that there are a number of left-wing states in the neighborhood now?

Admiral Turner:

Well, Saudi Arabia clearly is subject to some of the same pressures that Iran was but it is quite a different state and in quite a different stage of development. You can judge for yourself whether you think it is anywhere close to the Iranian model. It is a country of 4 million people as opposed to 38-some million in Iran. It is less Westernized, less industrialized, the economy internally has heated up less. There's more Saudi money in investment overseas as opposed to procurement and construction in the country. It is not a one-man rule, it is a family rule. And they have not strayed as far from Islamic tenets as they had to the perception of the Ayatollah's (~~spelling?~~) in Iran. So in those respects it is somewhat behind, you might say, the situation in Iran. On the other hand, one would have to point out that there are large numbers of expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia, a condition which, while it existed in modest numbers in Iran, it is not to the 50% or thereabouts that exists in Saudi Arabia today. So they have other problems such as that which they must consider. And they do have their intimate relationship with the leadership of the Arab world, in one sense, their relationship with the PLO and its numerous elements including a fairly extensive Palestinian population in ~~Iran~~ <sup>Saudi Arabia</sup>. So it has other dangers which did not exist in Iran. The plusses and minuses in all of these lead me to believe that Saudi Arabia is not in a dangerous situation today as Iran was last year or last fall.

